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THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER WAVE:
AN INTRODUCTION
WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD*

It will take time to place "the conglomerate merger wave" in perspective and evaluate its consequences. Few industrial events have excited quite
the hyperbole, on many sides, evoked by the recent fast growth of a number
of new firms, even though they are still a minor and untested factor compared to established firms (including older conglomerates).
The cross-currents of opposing interests, some of them very deep and
powerful, have surfaced both in commentary and in policy. Where the
pressures and complexities of the issues so greatly transcend the stock of
empirical knowledge, there is bound to be confusion.
This brief introductory note will try to specify the economic questions
which will endure beyond the present phase of the debate and to comment
on one aspect of policy. The papers which follow do address, or at least
touch on, most of these issues, in some cases creatively.' The papers are
remarkably fresh and thoughtful for a collection arranged at short notice
and dealing with a phenomenon which has gained prominence so recently.
Much of the facts and competitive issues have changed recently, since for
example the Hart Committee's hearings in 1965.2 Judging by the present
Symposium and other sources, the following four research issues appear
likely to persist.
First, what are the extent and direction of the conglomerate trend so
far? Data from the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics have
suggested a large and growing shift, 3 but there are grounds for skepticism.

Raymond Piccini's paper suggests a rather smaller conglomerate content in
1951-1961 mergers than the FTC data convey. 4 Charles H. Berry has shown
that the "true" degree of diversification by large firms increased only by 3 to
5 percent during 1960-1965, far less than the 40 percent rise in the numbers
of industries in which these firms operated. 5 The net permanent addition via
conglomerate mergers to meta-concentration is in doubt, partly because the
durability of many of the newer conglomerates is unknown. The more recent
large mergers include some heterogeneity in assets, ranging from manufacturing to financial categories. J. Fred Weston notes (as have others) that the
* Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Michigan. B.A., Amherst
College, 1957; M.A., Yale University, 1958; Ph.D., Yale University, 1963.
1 Within the time constraints, the St. John's Law Review was able to supply 16 articles
to the present writer to read in preparing this note.
2 Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965).
3 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969).
4
See p. 171 infra,
5C. BERRY, CORPORATE GROWTH AND INDUSTRiAL DIVERSIFICATION 1-18 (1969).
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rise in meta-concentration may have been overstated in the FTC, Census
6
and Fortune tabulations. The scope and incidence of "new" conglomerate
formation has not been adequately compared with that of "old" diversification by established firms. Nor has the evolution of old diversification been
analyzed fully.
There is evidently room for much skepticism and further study of the
volume and incidence of true conglomerate growth - both gross and net in the past. These questions contain difficult problems of definition and
conjecture, and so they are likely to persist.
Second, will the past trends continue? What economic determinants are
at work? In both the United States and Great Britain, 1969 may have burst
the conglomerate bubble for good, or it may be only a pause. It is too early
to say, though the recent drastic drop does lend this Symposium an ironic,
perhaps retrospective, status. Whether they are a financial phenomenon (as
7
John M. Kuhlman and Richard Duke suggest ) or reflect genuine economies
(as Weston and others believe), they may be expected to revive after the
present financial conditions change. But a Kuhlman-Duke conglomerate has
economic importance primarily when it may switch from growth to long-run
profit maximizing objectives. More research on the determinants and incentives of diversification (via merger and otherwise) is needed in order to
predict the future trends, both in volume and character, and thereby place
the past changes and policy issues in correct perspective.
Third, what real effects on competitive conditions and economic performance does diversification (including conglomerate mergers) have? The
size and incidence of diversification within individual markets may be the
main factors, together with the internal strength and centralization of control of the conglomerate firms.8 There may also be other factors. In any case,
the size and incidence of past diversification and the recent mergers are only
beginning to be known. 9 The inner character of diversified firms is in doubt;
vide Weston's and Kuhlman and Duke's contrasting papers. And no causality (as distinct from correlation) between diversification and enterprise behavior has yet been established. 10
Therefore fourth, the net costs and benefits of diversification, old and
new, are still obscure. If the newer conglomerates are not a trivial economic
matter, then their economic effects may usually include: (1) widening the
acquired firm's competitive options via improved access to capital, and (2)
realization of economies in management and coordination, etc., as is frequently claimed. Even if the conglomerates are trivial (and also if they are
6 See pp. 77, 78 infra.
7 See p. 61 infra.
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DIVERSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1962).

CONGLOMERATE MERGER WAVE
not), (3) their take-over threats may discipline firms prone to X-inefficiency."
This third effect (discussed especially by Berry and L. E. Birdzell) may be
large, though all three effects (and other possible ones) are still largely unknown. A framework for analysis of such costs and benefits clearly needs to
be developed, even if most of the variables in it would be nearly empty
boxes for the time being. One may expect, at this point, that the net
economic effects of conglomerate mergers either way will usually turn out
to be small, compared to those both of established diversification and of
other elements of market structure. Until the analytical framework is made
explicit and the research done- which may take many more years - one
can do little more than conjecture.
Such imprecision of economic guidelines need not paralyze antitrust action toward conclomerates, though it does counsel moderation. As a matter
of general antitrust strategy, no potentially important variable in the evaluation should be ignored outright. The apparent shift of policy in 1969 against
large-firm mergers, especially those by newer conglomerates, seems to ignore
entirely the take-over discipline on inefficiency. 12 It would shield precisely
those firms which it purports to constrain, and the resulting loss in efficiency
could outweigh the other gains in competition and performance (as Berry
and Birdzell note). The Campbell-Shepherd proposal runs some of this risk,
too, but it can be easily adapted to retain much of the take-over probabilities.'8 Under it, all firms ranking below the leading firms in individual
industries are exempt. The original proposal illustrated a possible eventual
scope of such a treatment, but a lesser quantitative reach could be adopted
within the basic framework. The threshold for market size and "leadingfirm" shares could be raised. Firms could be exempted if their leading positions are only in their secondary products (e.g., which comprise less than
one-third of their sales, or some such fraction); in such cases, the entrenching
effects, if any, may already be present and a further merger will add little
to them.
Such quantitative adjustments trade off the pro-competitive effects for
the take-over effects, at the margin. The optimum quantitative balance is
presently a matter for conjecture, but one can illustrate how far alternative
adjustments would reach. As a first approximation, moderate adjustments as
suggested above would in 1968 have left exempt about 9 of the largest 50
11 However, the threatened firms may divert their efforts toward purely tactical
maneuvers to prevent a take-over rather than toward reducing internal inefficiency as the
best long-run defense, Such a diversion may subtract from efficiency, not add to it. Generally, a Weston type conglomerate will be more likely to drive target firms toward true
efficiency improvements, while a Kuhlman-Duke type conglomerate may evoke only the
more superficial short-run stratagems, because they may suffice to ward off such threats.
12
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manufacturing firms, about 19 of the 51-100 group, about 25 of the 101-150
group, and about 12 of the 151-175 group, as ranked by sales. In contrast to
the Neal Report and Attorney General Mitchell, 14 who reach beyond this
entire group of 175 firms, our proposal would preserve the take-over threat
of perhaps 60 to 70 of the largest 175 firms.15 It would also retain the deterrence against the main probable anticompetitive effects of leading-firm conglomerate mergers.
The whole question begs for more precision of definition and empirical
knowledge. But this seems to be at least the right basis for framing the policy
choices. One hopes that this Symposium will evoke more research on those
main questions and more exactitude in framing antitrust strategy.
14 See note 12 supra.
15 The strength and direction of take-over possibilities depends partly on the character of the potential acquiring firms. Many of the 60 to 70 firms noted here are oil and
steel companies, but the majority are spread over a wide variety of industries.

